


Week 13 Handout

Below are categories of things Sellars takes not to be “in the world (or reality) in the narrow sense,” namely the world as it could be even if there never were any discursive practices/practitioners.

These sorts of things are excluded for him because expressions for them on his analyses are necessarily metalinguistic, and metalinguistic expressions have no referents in worlds without object languages.

- i. facts (states of affairs), picked out by nominalizations of sentences,
- ii. universals, picked out by nominalizations of monadic predicates,
- iii. relations, picked out by nominalizations of polyadic predicates,
- iv. kinds, picked out by nominalizations of sortal terms,
- v. events, picked out by nominalizations of sentences with temporal connectives,
- vi. subjunctively robust relations of consequence and incompatibility, expressed by alethic modal vocabulary,
- vii. *abstracta*, terms introduced by abstraction: an equivalence relation on relatively more concrete things picked out in a base vocabulary is treated as substitution-licensing identity,
- viii. norms: what is expressed by normative, specifically deontic vocabulary,
- ix. meanings, picked out by expressions that functionally classify other expressions.



Nested Kinds of Use	Contrasts with	Defined by
Declaratives Most General Fact-Stating	Imperatives, Interrogatives	‘Situation in space of implications’  Assertible. Can be premises and conclusions of inferences  Embeddable in conditionals and negations
Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Prescriptions	Normative direction of fit is word to world
Empirical Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Fictional Descriptions	1) Normative governance of describings by describeds  2) Subjunctive tracking of describeds by describings
Narrowly Empirical Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Broadly Empirical Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Subjunctive tracking not necessarily mediated by tokenings of linguistic expressions

Sellarsian raw materials drawn on here:

1. It is only because the expressions in terms of which we describe objects...locate these objects in a space of implications, that they describe at all, rather than merely label. [CDCM §108]
2. [O]nce the tautology ‘The world is described by descriptive concepts’ is freed from the idea that the business of all non-logical concepts is to describe, the way is clear to an *ungrudging* recognition that many expressions which empiricists have relegated to second-class citizenship in discourse are not *inferior*, just *different*. [CDCM §79]
3. Two-ply account of observation, from EPM.
4. Characterization of observable/theoretical distinction as epistemological rather than ontological.
5. Distinction between ‘the world in the narrow sense,’ and the world in the ‘broader’ sense that includes discursive practices.
6. S’s master-argument that essentially *metalinguistic* concepts do not specify items in the world in the narrow sense.
7. SRLG invocation of causal involvements of *representings* of a rule to distinguish the rule-governed from the merely regular.